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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the coordination of inventory control in three-echelon
serial and distribution systems under decentralized control. All installations in these
supply chains track echelon inventories. Under decentralized control the installations will
decide upon base stock levels that minimize their own inventory costs. In general these
levels do not coincide with the optimal base stock levels in the global optimum of the chain
under centralized control. Hence, the total cost under decentralized control is larger than
under centralized control.
To remove this cost inefficiency, two simple coordination mechanisms are presented:
one for serial systems and one for distribution systems. Both mechanisms are initiated by
the most downstream installation(s). The upstream installation increases its base stock
level while the downstream installation compensates the upstream one for the increase
of costs and provides it with a part of its gain from coordination. It is shown that
both coordination mechanisms result in the global optimum of the chain being the unique
Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. Furthermore, all installations agree
upon the use of these mechanisms because they result in lower costs per installation. The
practical implementation of these mechanisms is discussed.
Key Words: supply chain, coordination mechanism, Nash equilibrium, strategic game,
inventory control, multi-echelon system.
AMS Subject Classification: 90B50, 91A10, 91A35, 90B05.
1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the coordination of inventory control in three-echelon serial
and distribution systems under decentralized control. All installations in these supply chains
track echelon inventories. Under decentralized control an installation will decide upon a base
stock level that minimizes its inventory cost by taking into account only its own costs. It
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neglects the external effects of its decision on others. Hence, the system consists of selfish
installations and it is therefore not surprising that in general their decisions are not optimal
from the perspective of the supply chain as a whole. Thus, the total cost of the system under
decentralized control is larger than in the supply chain optimum.
To improve upon this cost inefficiency asks for some coordination between the installations.
While maintaining decentralized decision-making, the goal of a coordination mechanism is
to change the structure of the installations’ costs such that the individual decisions of the
installations are optimal for the system as a whole, that is, they coincide with the optimal
decisions under centralized control. Furthermore, the coordination mechanism should make
each installation better off, that is, it should result in lower cost. Applying such a mechanism
results in the total cost of the system being as low as possible. All firms should agree upon
the use of a certain coordination mechanism; this can be achieved by negotiations between
the installations.
The basic systems under consideration, three-echelon serial and distribution systems, are
widely studied in the literature. The concept of echelon stock was introduced in Clark and
Scarf [5]. They showed the value of echelon stock for integrated control of serial systems
compared to local stock, as well as the optimality of inventory control by means of echelon base
stock levels. Langenhoff and Zijm [10] study multi-echelon production/distribution systems
under centralized control. In case of a distribution system, the depot is allowed to keep stock.
They derive optimal base stock policies for serial and distribution systems. A distribution
system with a stockless depot (supplier) is considered in Eppen and Schrage [6]. For a review
on multi-stage serial systems we refer to Van Houtum, Inderfurth and Zijm [9].
In case of both serial and distribution systems, the literature recognizes that decentralized
control leads to larger total costs. Several papers study coordination mechanisms, mostly for
distribution systems. A two-echelon serial supply chain is investigated by Cachon and Zipkin
[3]. In that paper each installation may incur a consumer backorder penalty cost because the
upper stage (supplier) is assumed to dislike backorders of his product at the retailer. Two
noncooperative games are considered, based on whether local or echelon inventory is tracked.
These games nearly always have a unique Nash equilibrium which differs from the global
optimum. Under specific conditions the global optimum can be achieved if local inventory is
tracked as a (possibly non-unique) Nash equilibrium by using a linear transfer payment.
Gu¨llu¨, Van Houtum, Alis¸an and Erkip [8] analyze a decentralized supply chain consisting of
a supplier and two independent retailers. When the supplier receives his orders, the retailers
get the opportunity to redistribute their initial orders among themselves. This is done to
improve the expected cost based upon the information that has become available in the
meantime. It is shown that under mild conditions there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for
the retailers base stock levels. This need not coincide with the global optimal levels.
A distribution system with one supplier and N retailers is studied in Cachon [2]. All firms
pay inventory and backorder cost; the backorder cost for the supplier reflects the supplier’s
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interest in the availability of his product at the retailers, as in [3]. A retailer continuously
monitors his inventory and uses an (r, q) ordering policy for replenishment: whenever his
inventory position drops to r he places an order for q units. Demand for the product is
Poisson distributed. The supplier serves the retailers on a first-come-first-serve basis. It
is shown that the competitive solution need not coincide with the global optimum. Three
cooperation strategies are discussed, of which two lead to the global optimum being a Nash
equilibrium.
The model of [3] is extended by Wang, Guo and Efstathiou [15] to a distribution system
with 1 supplier and n different retailers, each with its own lead time and holding cost. After
studying the system under decentralized control, coordination mechanisms are examined.
In case the firms track echelon inventories, a contract is presented in which the retailers
pay a nonlinear tariff (a nonlinear function of the base stock level) to the supplier. This
contract ensures that the system optimal solution is the unique Nash equilibrium of the
game. Nevertheless, nonlinear tariffs are not easy to implement.
Other models of coordination of inventories in serial or distribution systems include [1, 4,
7, 12, 13, 14].
In the literature, most coordination mechanisms are such that the retailer is induced to
adopt the globally optimal base stock level. Opposed to this, using arguments from game
theory, in our model the retailer (the installation downstream) will take the initiative to
induce the supplier (the installation upstream) to change his decision. We present simple
coordination mechanisms under the (natural) assumption that installations only communicate
with their direct neighbors upstream and downstream in the supply chain. Further, all order
decisions are based upon echelon inventory. The coordination is such that the upstream
installation increases its base stock level while the downstream installation compensates the
upstream one for the increase of costs. Besides, the downstream installation transfers a part
of its cost savings less the compensation paid to the upstream installation, its gain from
the coordination. Both the mechanisms for serial and distribution systems result in the
installations choosing the global optimal base stock levels. This choice of base stock levels is
the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game played by the installations.
Further, all agree upon the use of these mechanisms because they result in lower costs per
installation.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In the next Section we briefly recall results of serial
systems under centralized control. In Section 3 serial systems under decentralized control
are studied. A coordination mechanism for these systems and its practical implementation
are presented in Section 4. Distribution systems under decentralized control are analysed in
Section 5, and a coordination mechanism for these systems, as well as its implementation, is
presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Three-echelon serial systems under centralized control
We start by studying inventory control for a single good in a three-echelon serial system. Such
a system is a supply chain consisting of three installations in a series. The installations are
numbered from 1, the most downstream installation, to 3. An echelon is a set of installations,
starting from a certain installation and including all installations downstream. Echelons are
numbered according to their most upstream installation. Hence, in the serial system under
consideration, echelon i includes the installations i down to 1.
Demand for the good occurs only at the most downstream installation, installation 1. The
distribution function of the l-period cumulative demand ul is denoted by Fl. If l = 1 we write
F instead of F1. Let µ denote the expected demand per period.
The installations determine the quantity of the orders for replenishment of their stock on
the basis of their echelon inventory position. The echelon stock of an installation consists of all
stock at that installation plus all stock in transit to or on hand at any installation downstream
minus eventual backlogs at installation 1. The echelon inventory position denotes the echelon
stock plus materials that are already ordered but not yet delivered at the most upstream
installation in the echelon.
All installations place their orders for replenishment of stock at the end of a period. A
material shortage at installation 2 or 3 is possible, leading to incomplete fulfilment of the
orders of installation 1 or 2. Any excess demand is backlogged. The ordered goods are
delivered after a fixed lead time. Namely, it takes l3 periods to transfer materials from the
outside supplier, who can always deliver, to installation 3, and li periods are needed to transfer
materials from installation i+ 1 to installation i, i = 1, 2.
The holding costs for installation i are hi+ . . .+h3 for goods at installation i and, if i > 1,
for goods in transfer to installation i − 1. Installation 1 pays a penalty cost p for unfilled
demand. All these costs are linear in time and quantity and occur at the end of a period.
In [10] a natural definition for the echelon cost functions of all installations is developed.
We briefly repeat this. Let xi denote the echelon stock associated with installation i at the
beginning of a period before demand occurs. Assign the following one-period holding and
penalty cost to installation 1:
L1(x1) = h1
∫ ∞
0
(x1 − u)dF (u) + (p+ h1 + h2 + h3)
∫ ∞
x1
(u− x1)dF (u).
Assign
Lj(xj) = hj
∫ ∞
0
(xj − u)dF (u)
to installation j, j = 2, 3.
Let DN (y1, . . . , yN ) denote the average total cost of an N-echelon serial system if at the
beginning of every period the echelon inventory position of echelon i is increased by installation
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i to yi, where y1 ≤ y2 ≤ . . . ≤ yN . As shown by [10] the cost DN is composed of N terms
DN (y1, . . . , yN ) = C1(y1) + C2(y1, y2) + . . .+ CN (y1, . . . , yN )
where
C1(y1) =
∫ ∞
0
L1(y1 − ul1)dFl1(ul1)
and
Cj(y1, . . . , yj) =
∫ ∞
0
Lj(yj − ulj )dFlj (ulj )
+
∫ ∞
yj−yj−1
[Cj−1(y1, . . . , yj−2, yj − ulj )− Cj−1(y1, . . . , yj−2, yj−1)]dFlj (ulj )
for j = 2, . . . , N . In the expression for Cj the second integral represents a penalty cost for
installation j if it cannot fulfil the order of installation j − 1, that is, if yj − ulj < yj−1.
Lemma 2.1 The average cost of an N -echelon serial system, N = 1, 2, 3, can be written as
D1(y1) = h1(y1 − (l1 + 1)µ) + (p+ h1 + h2 + h3)
∫ ∞
y1
(ul1+1 − y1)dFl1+1(ul1+1),
D2(y1, y2) = D1(y1) + h2(y2 − (l2 + 1)µ) +
∫ ∞
y2−y1
[D1(y2 − ul2)−D1(y1)]dFl2(ul2),
and
D3(y1, y2, y3) = D2(y1, y2) + h3(y3 − (l3 + 1)µ)
+
∫ ∞
y3−y2
[D2(y1, y3 − ul3)−D2(y1, y2)]dFl3(ul3).
All proofs can be found in Section 8. This Lemma shows that the cost Di of echelon i > 1
consist of the cost of echelon i−1 plus additional holding cost and a kind of penalty in case of
a shortage, yi − uli < yi−1. In [10] the minimum of D3(y1, y2, y3) is found, which is repeated
in the Lemma below.
Lemma 2.2 ([10]) The cost function D3(y1, y2, y3) is minimized in (y1, y2, y3) = (S1, S2, S3)
where S1 minimizes D1(y1), S2 minimizes D2(S1, y2) and S3 minimizes D3(S1, S2, y3).
To implement this optimal solution, centralized control is needed. But in practice, there is no
centralized but decentralized control. The installations act on their own and independently
decide about their base stock levels yi. Thereafter these choices are implemented over an
infinite horizon. Such a situation can be modeled as a noncooperative strategic game (see
[11]) in which each installation, or player, has to make one decision. These decisions are made
independently and simultaneously. Further, a strategic game consists of a set of players and
for each player a strategy set and a cost function. Here, the three installations are the players.
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The strategy set Yi of player i is defined as the set of all possible echelon base stock levels.
A triple of strategies (y1, y2, y3) is also referred to as a strategy profile. The cost function Hi
of player i is defined on all strategy profiles and will be specified further on. Each player will
choose the base stock level that minimizes its cost.
Special interest goes to equilibria, or stable outcomes, of the game. A strategy profile
(y¯1, y¯2, y¯3) of base stock levels is called a Nash equilibrium of the game if unilateral devia-
tions cannot reduce cost: H1(y¯1, y¯2, y¯3) ≤ H1(y1, y¯2, y¯3), H2(y¯1, y¯2, y¯3) ≤ H2(y¯1, y2, y¯3) and
H3(y¯1, y¯2, y¯3) ≤ H3(y¯1, y¯2, y3) for all yi ∈ Yi, i = 1, 2, 3. Let
r1(y2, y3) = {y1 ∈ Y1|H1(y1, y2, y3) ≤ H1(y′1, y2, y3) for all y′1 ∈ Y1}
be the set of best base stock levels for installation 1 given the levels y2 and y3 of the other
installations. The function r1 is called a best reply function of installation 1. The best reply
function r2(y1, y3) of installation 2 and r3(y1, y2) of installation 3 are defined similarly. Now
if a strategy profile (y¯1, y¯2, y¯3) satisfies
y¯1 ∈ r1(y¯2, y¯3), y¯2 ∈ r2(y¯1, y¯3) and y¯3 ∈ r3(y¯1, y¯2)
then it is a Nash equilibrium. This definition of a Nash equilibrium will be used in the sequel.
3 Three-echelon serial systems under decentralized control
In this Section we assume that the three installations act on their own, that is, we are dealing
with a three-echelon serial system under decentralized control. If yi is the base stock level
of installation i then the real order-up-to level as experienced by installation 3 is y3, the
desired order-up-to-level, because his supplier can always deliver. If y2 > y3 − ul3 then
installation 2 is confronted with a shortage at installation 3 and receives only y3−ul3 instead
of y2. Therefore he experiences the order-up-to level w2 = min(y3 − ul3 , y2) and similarly
installation 1 experiences w1 = min(w2 − ul2 , y1). These real order-up-to levels are useful in
simplifying the expression for the average cost of the system.
Lemma 3.1 The average cost of a three-echelon serial system is equal to
D3(y1, y2, y3) = h3(y3 − (l3 + 1)µ) + ED2(y1, w2)
where E denotes taking the expectation, and where
D2(y1, w2) = h2(w2 − (l2 + 1)µ) + ED1(w1)
and
D1(w1) = h1(w1 − (l1 + 1)µ) + (p+ h1 + h2 + h3)
∫ ∞
w1
(ul1+1 − w1)dFl1+1(ul1+1).
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The above expression for the average cost D3(y1, y2, y3) of the system was obtained from the
assignment of certain one-period costs to the echelons. These costs are not the real one-
period costs of the echelons. The true one-period cost for installation 1 consist of holding
cost h1 + h2 + h3 if there are goods in stock and penalty cost p otherwise,
L˜1(x1) = (h1 + h2 + h3)
∫ x1
0
(x1 − u)dF (u) + p
∫ ∞
x1
(u− x1)dF (u).
This implies the expected true average cost
D˜1(y1) =
∫ ∞
0
L˜1(y1 − ul1)dFl1(ul1)
= D1(y1) + (h2 + h3)(y1 − (l1 + 1)µ) (3.1)
for the one-echelon system with base stock level y1. Since the real order-up-to level for
installation 1 in a three-echelon system is not y1 but w1, the expected cost for this installation,
H˜1(y1, y2, y3), is H˜1(y1, y2, y3) = ED˜1(w1). The true expected cost H˜2 for installation 2
consists of inventory cost for goods in transit to 1 and inventory cost, if any, for goods that
remain after fulfilling the order of echelon 1,
H˜2(y1, y2, y3) = (h2 + h3)l1µ+ (h2 + h3)E
∫ ∞
0
max(w2 − ul2 − y1, 0)dFl2(ul2).
The true cost H˜3 for installation 3 are defined similarly as for 2. Let wˆi = Ewi denote
the expected order-up-to level of installation i. Rewriting these cost functions results in the
following expressions.
Lemma 3.2 The expected true costs for the three installations are equal to
H˜1(y1, y2, y3) = ED1(w1) + (h2 + h3)(wˆ1 − (l1 + 1)µ),
H˜2(y1, y2, y3) = (h2 + h3)l1µ+ (h2 + h3)(wˆ2 − l2µ− wˆ1),
and
H˜3(y1, y2, y3) = h3l2µ+ h3(y3 − l3µ− wˆ2).
These cost functions distribute the total cost D3 of the system among the installations.
Lemma 3.3
∑3
i=1 H˜i(y1, y2, y3) = D3(y1, y2, y3)
In the strategic game with cost functions H˜i each installation will choose a base stock level
that minimizes its cost. Installation 3 minimizes its cost H˜3 in y3 = y2. Similarly, installation
2 will set y2 = y1. Hence, neither of these installations will keep any extra stock. Knowing
this, installation 1 will minimize its cost H˜1 in y1 = S˜1 where S˜1 > S1. Therefore, the Nash
equilibrium of the game under decentralized control equals (y1, y2, y3) = (S˜1, S˜1, S˜1). This
implies that installation 1 is confronted with large costs because it is very likely that there
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Figure 1: Serial communication between the three installations.
are material shortages at either installation 2 or 3. Because of this installation 1 would like
the installations 2 and 3 to set yj > y1, j = 2, 3, such that the probability of a material
shortage decreases and consequently the costs of 1 decrease. But yj > y1 increases the cost
of installation j. Thus installation j is only willing to increase yj to a level above y1 if he is
compensated for his extra costs. In the next Section we study a proposal by installation 1 for
compensation of the installations 2 and 3. This proposal coordinates the serial chain.
4 Coordination mechanism for serial systems
In practice it does not seem likely that the installations 1 and 3 communicate directly since
installation 2 is in between. Instead, the installations only talk with their neighbors in the
serial system. Figure 1 shows this situation, where the arrows indicate the communication
possibilities. Assume that the installations communicate in this way.
Under decentralized control the installations in a three-echelon serial system will choose
base stock levels (y1, y2, y3) = (S˜1, S˜1, S˜1), as argued in the previous Section. In that situation
installation 1 has a large base stock level and is therefore confronted with large costs. To be
able to lower his base stock level, and consequently his cost, this installation will negotiate
with installation 2 with the goal of achieving lower costs by means of coordination of actions.
4.1 Coordination between the installations 1 and 2
The following coordination mechanism is proposed. Installation 1 asks installation 2 to keep
some stock, that is, to set y2 such that y2 > y1. This increases the cost of installation
2 because now he also has to pay for the inventory cost of his extra stock. Installation 1
offers the following compensation. First, installation 2 is fully compensated for his increase
in inventory cost. This implies that installation 2 has no additional cost compared to the
situation before negotiation, but also no additional gain. Second, to persuade installation
2 to accept this offer, he also receives a part of the so-called surplus of 1, which is its cost
savings less the compensation paid to installation 2. This is the gain of installation 2 from
this negotiation.
If installation 2 sets y2 > y1 then his cost increases by
H˜2(y1, y2, y3)− H˜2(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)
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whereas the cost of 1 decreases by
H˜1(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)− H˜1(y1, y2, y3).
Installation 1 fully compensates installation 2 for his cost increase. After this, the cost savings
of 1 are reduced to
H˜1(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)− H˜1(y1, y2, y3)− (H˜2(y1, y2, y3)− H˜2(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1))
= D3(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)− H˜3(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)− (D3(y1, y2, y3)− H˜3(y1, y2, y3)),
where the equality follows from Lemma 3.3. Call this value the surplus of installation 1, or
surplus-1 in short. Installation 1 will give installation 2 a fraction α, 0 < α < 1, of this
surplus. This provides an incentive for installation 2 to accept the offer by installation 1
because the costs of installation 2 are now lower than before the negotiation. Notice that
the bounds for α are strict since installation 1 likes to keep a part of his surplus for himself
while installation 2 wants to receive something extra next to being compensated for his cost
increase.
Let H ′i denote the cost of installation i, i = 1, 2, after the compensation. Then installation
1 pays his initial cost H˜1, compensates installation 2 for his cost increase and gives him a
fraction of surplus-1, resulting in
H ′1(y1, y2, y3)
= H˜1(y1, y2, y3) + (H˜2(y1, y2, y3)− H˜2(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1))
+ α(D3(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)− H˜3(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)− (D3(y1, y2, y3)− H˜3(y1, y2, y3)))
= (1− α)(D3(y1, y2, y3)− H˜3(y1, y2, y3))
+ α(D3(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)− H˜3(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1))− H˜2(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1).
Installation 2 pays his own cost H˜2 and receives a compensation of installation 1 as well as a
fraction of surplus-1. His cost change to
H ′2(y1, y2, y3)
= H˜2(y1, y2, y3)− (H˜2(y1, y2, y3)− H˜2(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1))
− α(D3(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)− H˜3(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)− (D3(y1, y2, y3)− H˜3(y1, y2, y3)))
= α(D3(y1, y2, y3)− H˜3(y1, y2, y3))
− α(D3(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)− H˜3(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)) + H˜2(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1).
Notice that the new cost functions are a rearrangement of the former ones,
H ′1(y1, y2, y3) +H
′
2(y1, y2, y3) = H˜1(y1, y2, y3) + H˜2(y1, y2, y3). (4.1)
During these negotiations the base stock level of installation 3 remains unchanged, namely
y3 = y2. This equality says that installation 3 keeps no stock and only has to pay the inventory
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cost of goods in transit to installation 2. This cost H˜3(y1, y2, y2) = h3l2µ is independent from
y1 and y2. Therefore, minimizing both H ′1 and H ′2 under y3 = y2 is equivalent to minimizing
D3(y1, y2, y2). This minimization has a remarkable outcome.
Theorem 4.1 The cost function D3(y1, y2, y2) is minimized in y1 = S1, the optimal base
stock level of installation 1 under centralized control, and y2 = S˜2 > S2.
Hence, installation 1 minimizes his new cost function by setting his base stock level equal to
his optimal level under centralized control. Installation 2 picks a base stock level larger than
his optimal level under centralized control. Both parties will agree on this outcome only if it
results in decreased individual costs.
Theorem 4.2 In the minimum (y1, y2, y3) = (S1, S˜2, S˜2), surplus-1 equals D3(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1) −
D3(S1, S˜2, S˜2) > 0. The installations 1 and 2 are better off under coordination because
H ′i(S1, S˜2, S˜2) < H˜i(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1), i = 1, 2.
Thus, the coordination results in lower costs for the installations 1 and 2. Both are better off
and agree to use this coordination mechanism.
4.2 Coordination between the installations 2 and 3
The negotiation between the installations 1 and 2 ends in the base stock levels (S1, S˜2, S˜2).
The levels of the installations 2 and 3 are equal, because 3 still does not keep stock and
consequently, 2 is confronted with large costs. He would like installation 3 to keep some
stock, that is y3 > y2, so as to decrease his own costs. In exchange, installation 2 offers him
a compensation for his increase in cost plus a part of the so-called surplus-2. All along, the
base stock level of installation 1 remains S1, the result of the previous coordination.
Although installation 2 negotiates with installation 3, the negotiations do not only affect
installation 2 but also installation 1. Any resulting cost savings for installation 2 result in
lower compensations to be paid by installation 1. In other words, the negotiations lead to cost
savings for echelon 2. Knowing this, installation 1 will have no problems with installation 2
negotiating with installation 3 on behalf of echelon 2. And that is exactly what will happen.
A part of the compensation is surplus-2, which is the remainder of the cost savings of
echelon 2 after compensating installation 3 for his increased costs:
Surplus-2 = H ′1(S1, S˜2, S˜2) +H
′
2(S1, S˜2, S˜2)− (H ′1(S1, y2, y3) +H ′2(S1, y2, y3))
− (H˜3(S1, y2, y3)− H˜3(S1, S˜2, S˜2))
= D3(S1, S˜2, S˜2)−D3(S1, y2, y3).
Installation 3 receives a fraction β, 0 < β < 1, of this surplus. This should persuade him to
accept the deal with installation 2 because it results in costs that are lower than before the
negotiation.
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Let Hi denote the cost of installation i after the compensation. Then the installations
1 and 2 pay their own cost, compensate 3 for his cost increase and give him a part β of
surplus-2:
(H1 +H2)(S1, y2, y3)
= H ′1(S1, y2, y3) +H
′
2(S1, y2, y3) + (H˜3(S1, y2, y3)− H˜3(S1, S˜2, S˜2))
+ β(D3(S1, S˜2, S˜2)−D3(S1, y2, y3))
= (1− β)D3(S1, y2, y3)− H˜3(S1, S˜2, S˜2) + βD3(S1, S˜2, S˜2).
The compensation changes the cost of installation 3 to
H3(S1, y2, y3)
= H˜3(S1, y2, y3)− (H˜3(S1, y2, y3)− H˜3(S1, S˜2, S˜2))− β(D3(S1, S˜2, S˜2)−D3(S1, y2, y3))
= βD3(S1, y2, y3) + H˜3(S1, S˜2, S˜2)− βD3(S1, S˜2, S˜2).
One sees from these expressions that minimizing both cost functions boils down to minimizing
D3(S1, y2, y3).
Theorem 4.3 The cost function D3(S1, y2, y3) is minimized in y2 = S2 and y3 = S3. There-
fore, the base stock levels become (S1, y2, y3) = (S1, S2, S3), the global optimum. In this
minimum, surplus-2 equals D3(S1, S˜2, S˜2) − D3(S1, S2, S3) > 0. The installations 1 and 2
and installation 3 are better off than before coordination because (H1 + H2)(S1, S2, S3) <
(H ′1 +H ′2)(S1, S˜2, S˜2) and H3(S1, S2, S3) < H˜3(S1, S˜2, S˜2).
The coordination mechanism proposed in the negotiations result in each installation choosing
its optimal base stock level as under centralized control. Hence, this mechanism ensures that
the optimal individual decisions of the selfish installations are also optimal for the entire serial
system.
The cost (H1+H2)(S1, S2, S3) of echelon 2 has to be divided among the installations 1 and
2. Recall that this cost consists of the individual costsH ′i(S1, S2, S3) of installation i = 1, 2 and
the compensation paid to installation 3, (H˜3(S1, S2, S3)−H˜3(S1, S˜2, S˜2))+β(D3(S1, S˜2, S˜2)−
D3(S1, S2, S3)). Naturally, each installation pays its own individual cost. Further, since
installation 2 negotiates directly with installation 3 due to serial communication, he should
pay the compensation to 3.
This cost division may seem unfavorable for installation 2 and resulting in large costs
because he has to pay something extra besides his own cost, but that need not be true. The
change in base stock levels from (S1, S˜2, S˜2) to (S1, S2, S3) results in an increase of surplus-1
of (H ′1 +H ′2)(S1, S˜2, S˜2)− (H ′1 +H ′2)(S1, S2, S3). Due to this increase, installation 2 receives
an extra amount of α((H ′1+H ′2)(S1, S˜2, S˜2)− (H ′1+H ′2)(S1, S2, S3)) from installation 1. This
covers the compensation installation 2 has to pay to installation 3 if α satisfies
α >
H˜3(S1, S2, S3)− H˜3(S1, S˜2, S˜2) + β(D3(S1, S˜2, S˜2)−D3(S1, S2, S3))
(H ′1 +H ′2)(S1, S˜2, S˜2)− (H ′1 +H ′2)(S1, S2, S3)
=: α.
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The fraction α should be larger than some lower bound α, the compensation paid to instal-
lation 3 divided by the increase of surplus-1. Notice that α < 1.
Lemma 4.4 The cost division decreases the costs of installation 1, H ′1(S1, S2, S3) < H ′1(S1, S˜2, S˜2).
Installation 2 saves cost, H ′2(S1, S2, S3) + compensation to 3 < H ′2(S1, S˜2, S˜2), if α > α.
We conclude that both installations save cost if α is large enough. The overall result of the
negotiations is summarized in the Theorem below.
Theorem 4.5 Consider the strategic game played by the installations, where the cost func-
tions of the installations 1, 2 and 3 are H ′1, H ′2 and H3 due to the coordination mechanism.
If installation 2 pays the compensation to installation 3 and if α > α then the strategy profile
(y1, y2, y3) = (S1, S2, S3) is the unique Nash equilibrium in this game.
This result shows that under the right incentives the selfish installations take decisions that
are also optimal for the entire serial system. Besides all installations accept the incentives
because each of them saves costs.
4.3 Implementation in practice
In this subsection we show how the coordination mechanism can be implemented in practice
in a three-echelon serial system. As shown in Section 3, initially the players/installations
play a strategic game in which the true cost per period of player i is H˜i(y1, y2, y3). Individual
optimization of the costs implies (y1, y2, y3) = (S˜1, S˜1, S˜1), the outcome of the system under
decentralized control. In this optimum, installation 1 faces large costs because the installations
2 and 3 keep minimal stocks, y3 = y2 and y2 = y1.
Installation 1 starts its coordination with installation 2 by asking him to set y2 > y1 instead
of y2 = y1 under individual optimization. Suppose installation 2 does so. He announces the
use of base stock level y2 whereas installation 1 announces the use of y1. Let vt1,t2 denote the
realized cumulative demand over the periods t1, . . . , t2.
At the beginning of period t + l3 installation 2 decides to return his echelon inventory
position to y2. Due to a possible shortage at his supplier, installation 3, his actual echelon
inventory position is min(y3 − vt,t+l3−1, y2). At the beginning of period t+ l3 + l2 his echelon
stock becomes min(y3 − vt,t+l3−1, y2) − vt+l3,t+l3+l2−1. Now installation 1 wants to raise his
echelon inventory position to y1. This request by installation 1 can only be fulfilled by
installation 2 if the amount requested is smaller than his stock, that is, y1 ≤ min(y3 −
vt,t+l3−1, y2)− vt+l3,t+l3+l2−1.
These changes in inventory position influence the costs of both players as follows. First,
due to his larger base stock level y2 installation 2 may be faced with unsold goods for which
he has to pay additional inventory costs at the end of period t+ l3 + l2 + l1, namely
(h2 + h3)max(min(y3 − vt,t+l3−1, y2)− vt+l3,t+l3+l2−1 − y1, 0).
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This extra cost will be refunded by installation 1. Its expected value is H˜2(y1, y2, y3) −
H˜2(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1) and leads to the modified costs H˜1(y1, y2, y3)+(H˜2(y1, y2, y3)− H˜2(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1))
for installation 1 and H˜2(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1) for installation 2. Notice that installation 2 is indifferent
between being refunded and staying in the initial situation.
The second part of the compensation paid by installation 1 to installation 2 is a fraction
of the actual surplus of installation 1. This actual surplus is the difference between the actual
cost savings of installation 1 and the cost increase compensated to installation 2.
Initially, installation 1 uses base stock level y1 = S˜1. He can calculate this level because it
minimizes his cost function, S˜1 = argminy1 H˜1(y1, y1, y1). At the end of period t+ l3+ l2+ l1
the actual inventory position of installation 1 is
IP1 = min(min(y3 − vt,t+l3−1, y2)− vt+l3,t+l3+l2−1, y1)− vt+l3+l2,t+l3+l2+l1
while it would have been S˜1 − vt,t+l3+l2+l1 in the initial situation. Both these inventory
positions can be measured by keeping track of demand in the past l3 + l2 + l1 + 1 periods.
The actual inventory cost of installation 1 at the end of period t+ l3 + l2 + l1 is
(h1 + h2 + h3)max(IP1, 0) + pmax(−IP1, 0)
while they are
(h1 + h2 + h3)max(S˜1 − vt,t+l3+l2+l1+1, 0) + pmax(vt,t+l3+l2+l1+1 − S˜1, 0)
in the initial situation.
The transfer paid by installation 1 to installation 2 in this period is a fraction α of the
actual cost savings of installation 1 minus the compensation for installation 2
(h1 + h2 + h3)max(S˜1 − vt,t+l3+l2+l1+1, 0) + pmax(vt,t+l3+l2+l1+1 − S˜1, 0)
− ((h1 + h2 + h3)max(IP1, 0) + pmax(−IP1, 0))
− (h2 + h3)max(min(y3 − vt,t+l3−1, y2)− vt+l3,t+l3+l2−1 − y1, 0).
Installation 3’s policy remains y3 = y2 and therefore the expected transfer T (y1, y2, y2) is
T (y1, y2, y2) = α
[
H˜1(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)− H˜1(y1, y2, y2)− (H˜2(y1, y2, y2)− H˜2(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1))
]
= α
[
D3(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)−D3(y1, y2, y2)
]
where the last equality follows from Lemma 3.3 and H˜3(y1, y2, y2) = H˜3(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1) = h3l2µ.
The payment changes the costs of the players to
H˜1(y1, y2, y3) + (H˜2(y1, y2, y3)− H˜2(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)) + T (y1, y2, y2) = H ′1(y1, y2, y2)
for player 1 and
H˜2(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)− T (y1, y2, y2) = H ′2(y1, y2, y2)
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for player 2. The cost functions H ′i are the costs resulting from the coordination between
the installations 1 and 2 as described in Section 4.1. Minimizing the cost of player i boils
down to minimizing the total cost D3(y1, y2, y2) of the supply chain under y3 = y2. The
optimal choice of base stock levels is (y1, y2, y2) = (S1, S˜2, S˜2) (see Theorem 4.1). Hence,
the costs resulting from this coordination are H ′i(S1, S˜2, S˜2) for installation i. To summarize:
coordination between the installations 1 and 2 can be implemented in practice by considering
actual costs and keeping track of demands in the past l3 + l2 + l1 + 1 periods.
Among similar lines the coordination between the installations 2 and 3, as described in
Section 4.2, can be implemented.
5 Three-echelon distribution systems under decentralized con-
trol
A three-echelon distribution system consists of one supplier delivering goods to two local
retailers. These retailers are denoted by indices 1 and 2, and the supplier by index 3. The
leadtime for delivery of goods to the supplier is l2 while the leadtime for all retailers is l1.
The distribution function of the random demand u(n) at retailer n is denoted by F (n). The
cumulative demand per period is denoted by u and its expectation is µ.
The true one-period cost for retailer n consists of holding and penalty costs. If xn is the
echelon stock of retailer n at the beginning of a period then the true cost at the end of that
period are
L˜n(xn) = (h1 + h2)
∫ xn
0
(xn − u(n))dF (n)(u(n)) + p
∫ ∞
xn
(u(n) − xn)dF (n)(u(n)).
Using Cn(yn) = EL˜n(yn − u(n)l1 ) − h2(yn − (l1 + 1)µ(n)) as in [10], the expected average cost
for retailer n can be written as
D˜n(yn) =
∫ ∞
0
L˜n(yn − u(n)l1 )dF
(n)
l1
(u(n)l1 ) = Cn(yn) + h2(yn − (l1 + 1)µ(n))
(compare this to (3.1)).
The retailers place their orders for replenishment of stock at the supplier. Under the
balance assumption in [10], the supplier can distribute his echelon stock y3 − ul2 among the
retailers such that both retailers have an equal probability of stock-out, a so-called equal
fractile position [6]. Denote by zn[y3 − ul2 ] the amount allocated to retailer n according to
this distribution.
The real order-up-to level wn for retailer n depends on the base stock levels yn, n = 1, 2,
and the echelon stock y3− ul2 of the supplier. If the supplier’s stock is large enough then the
requests of the retailers will be fulfilled. Otherwise, we assume that the supplier distributes
his stock among the retailers according to the allocation functions zn. Thus,
wn =
{
yn, y1 + y2 ≤ y3 − ul2
zn[y3 − ul2 ], y1 + y2 > y3 − ul2
(5.1)
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and w1 + w2 = min(y1 + y2, y3 − ul2). Notice that in (5.1) the allocation function zn is used
if the supplier has a shortage, y1 + y2 > y3 − ul2 . In the next Section, where a coordination
mechanism for distribution systems is discussed, the allocation function zn is also used if the
supplier has no shortage, y3 − ul2 ≥ y1 + y2, to determine the compensation of each retailer
to the supplier.
The expected true average cost H˜n per period for retailer n is H˜n(y1, y2, y3) = ED˜n(wn).
The expected cost H˜3 per period for the supplier consist of the inventory cost of goods in
transit to the retailers and on stock:
H˜3(y1, y2, y3) = h2l1µ+ h2
∫ ∞
0
max(y3 − ul2 − (y1 + y2), 0)dFl2(ul2)
The cost functions H˜i divide the total cost D(3)(y1, y2, y3) of the distribution system among
the installations,
∑3
i=1 H˜i(y1, y2, y3) = D
(3)(y1, y2, y3). This total cost D(3)(y1, y2, y3) is min-
imized in the optimum under centralized control (the so-called global optimum) (y1, y2, y3) =
(S1, S2, S3), as shown in [10]. For retailer n the value Sn also minimizes Cn(yn).
Under decentralized control the supplier will keep its echelon base stock level y3 as low as
possible, namely y3 = y1 + y2. This way, its costs are only H˜3(y1, y2, y1 + y2) = h2l1µ. This
low base stock level implies wn = zn[y1+ y2− ul2 ] < yn; the retailers always receive less than
they ordered. Their costs are
H˜n(y1, y2, y1 + y2) = ECn(zn[y1 + y2 − ul2 ]) + h2(Ezn[y1 + y2 − ul2 ]− (l1 + 1)µ(n))
Minimizing this cost results in yn = S˜n 6= Sn. The outcome of the game under decentralized
control is (y1, y2, y3) = (S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2), which is unequal to the global optimum.
6 Coordination mechanism for distribution systems
Both retailers are not happy with the outcome under decentralized control, in which the
supplier keeps a minimal base stock level y3 = y1+y2. The following coordination mechanism
is proposed. Both retailers ask the supplier to increase his base stock level such that y3 >
y1 + y2. This implies a cost increase for the supplier of size
H˜3(y1, y2, y3)− H˜3(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2) = h2
∫ ∞
0
(y3 − ul2 − (w1 + w2))dFl2(ul2).
This extra cost will be compensated by the retailers. Retailer n will pay the part
h2
∫ ∞
0
(zn[y3 − ul2 ]− wn)dFl2(ul2) = h2E(zn[y3 − ul2 ]− wn).
This is the expected holding cost of the extra amount received by retailer n if the supplier
would always distribute the quantity y3 − ul2 according to the allocation function zn instead
of supplying wn. Due to this compensation the supplier is indifferent between cooperating
with the retailers and working on his own because both result in equal costs.
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The surplus of retailer n, his cost savings minus the compensation to the supplier, equals
H˜n(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2)− H˜n(y1, y2, y3)− h2E(zn[y3 − ul2 ]− wn).
To provide an incentive for the supplier to cooperate with the retailers, he receives a fraction γ,
0 < γ < 1, of the surplus of the retailers. Retailer n now faces his own cost, the compensation
to the supplier for the cost increase and the payment of a fraction γ of his surplus,
Hn(y1, y2, y3)
= H˜n(y1, y2, y3) + h2E(zn[y3 − ul2 ]− wn)
+ γ(H˜n(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2)− H˜n(y1, y2, y3)− h2E(zn[y3 − ul2 ]− wn))
= (1− γ)(H˜n(y1, y2, y3) + h2E(zn[y3 − ul2 ]− wn)) + γH˜n(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2).
These costs are minimized if the retailer sets his base stock level equal to his optimal level
under centralized control.
Lemma 6.1 Retailer n minimizes his cost Hn(y1, y2, y3) in yn = Sn.
The cost of the supplier after being compensated by the retailers is
H3(y1, y2, y3)
= H˜3(y1, y2, y3)−
2∑
n=1
h2E(zn[y3 − ul2 ]− wn)
−
2∑
n=1
γ(H˜n(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2)− H˜n(y1, y2, y3)− h2E(zn[y3 − ul2 ]− wn))
= γD(3)(y1, y2, y3) + H˜3(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2)− γD(3)(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2).
Obviously, if the retailers set yn = Sn then y3 = S3 minimizes the cost of the supplier. This
immediately implies the following result, which is presented without proof.
Theorem 6.2 Consider the strategic game played by the supplier and the retailers, where firm
i has cost function Hi due to the coordination mechanism. The strategy profile (y1, y2, y3) =
(S1, S2, S3) is the unique Nash equilibrium in this game.
The coordination mechanism results in each firm choosing its global optimal base stock level.
The incentive to use this mechanism is also present, as shown in the Theorem hereafter.
Theorem 6.3 All firms have a lower cost in the Nash equilibrium than in the initial situation,
Hi(S1, S2, S3) < H˜i(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2).
Therefore, also for distribution systems there exists a coordination mechanism that aligns the
incentives of the installations with those of the supply chain and results in cost savings for
each installation.
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6.1 Implementation in practice
In this subsection we show how the coordination mechanism can be implemented in practice
in a three-echelon distribution system with a supplier and two retailer. This implementation
is analogous to the one for serial systems in Section 4.3. As shown in Section 5, initially the
players play a strategic game in which the true cost per period of player i is H˜i(y1, y2, y3).
Assuming the players know the allocation functions zn each of them can optimize its individual
cost, resulting in (y1, y2, y3) = (S˜1, S˜2, S˜1+S˜2), the outcome of the system under decentralized
control. This outcome implies costs H˜i(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2) for player i. In this optimum, the
retailers face large costs because the supplier keeps a minimal stock, y3 = y1 + y2.
The retailers start their coordination with the supplier by asking him to set y3 > y1 + y2
instead of y3 = y1 + y2 under individual optimization. Suppose the supplier does so. He
announces the use of base stock level y3 whereas the retailers announce the use of y1 and y2.
Let v(n)t1,t2 denote the realized cumulative demand over the periods t1, . . . , t2 at retailer n and
let vt1,t2 be the total demand at both retailers.
At the beginning of period t the supplier decides to return his echelon inventory position
to y3. Then at the beginning of period t + l2 the echelon stock of the supplier becomes
y3−vt,t+l2−1. Now retailer n wants to raise his echelon inventory position to yn. The requests
for replenishments by the retailers can only be fulfilled by the supplier if the total amount
requested is smaller than his echelon stock, that is, y1 + y2 ≤ y3 − vt,t+l2−1. Otherwise, the
supplier will allocate his stock by means of the rationing functions zn. Hence, at time t+ l2
the inventory position of retailer n is raised to{
yn, y3 − vt,t+l2−1 ≥ y1 + y2,
zn[y3 − vt,t+l2−1], y3 − vt,t+l2−1 < y1 + y2.
These changes in inventory position influence the costs of the players as follows. First, due
to his larger base stock level y3 the supplier may be faced with unsold goods for which he has
to pay (additional) inventory costs at the end of period t+ l2 + l1, namely
h2max(y3 − vt,t+l2−1 − (y1 + y2), 0).
This extra cost will be refunded by the retailers. Retailer n refunds
h2max(zn[y3 − vt,t+l2−1]− yn, 0).
to the supplier. The expected value of this refund is h2E(zn[y3 − ul2 ]− wn) and leads to the
modified costs
H˜n(y1, y2, y3) + h2E(zn[y3 − ul2 ]− wn)
for retailer n and
H˜3(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2)
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for the supplier, who is indifferent between being refunded and staying in the initial situation.
The second part of the compensation paid by the retailers to the supplier is a fraction of
the actual surplus of the retailers. This actual surplus is the difference between the actual
cost savings of the retailer and the cost refunded to the supplier.
Initially, retailer n uses base stock level yn = S˜n. The retailer can calculate this level
because it minimizes his cost function, S˜n = argminyn H˜n(y1, y2, y1 + y2). At the end of
period t+ l2 + l1 the actual inventory position of retailer n is
IPn =
{
yn − v(n)t+l2,t+l2+l1 , y3 − vt,t+l2−1 ≥ y1 + y2
zn[y3 − vt,t+l2−1]− v(n)t+l2,t+l2+l1 , y3 − vt,t+l2−1 < y1 + y2.
instead of S˜n − v(n)t,t+l2+l1 in the initial situation. Both these inventory positions can be
measured by keeping track of demand in the past l2 + l1 + 1 periods. The actual inventory
cost of the retailer at the end of period t+ l2 + l1 is
(h1 + h2)max(IPn, 0) + pmax(−IPn, 0)
while they are
(h1 + h2)max(S˜n − v(n)t,t+l2+l1 , 0) + pmax(v
(n)
t,t+l2+l1
− S˜n, 0)
in the initial situation. The transfer paid by retailer n to the supplier in this period is a
fraction γ of the actual cost savings of the retailer minus the cost refunded to the supplier
(h1 + h2)max(S˜n − v(n)t,t+l2+l1 , 0) + pmax(v
(n)
t,t+l2+l1
− S˜n, 0)
− ((h1 + h2)max(IPn, 0) + pmax(−IPn, 0))
− h2max(zn[y3 − vt,t+l2−1]− yn, 0).
Now the expected transfer Tn(y1, y2, y3) is
Tn(y1, y2, y3) = γ
[
H˜n(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2)− H˜n(y1, y2, y3)− h2E(zn[y3 − ul2 ]− wn)
]
This transfer changes the costs of the players to
H˜n(y1, y2, y3) + h2E(zn[y3 − ul2 ]− wn) + Tn(y1, y2, y3)
= (1− γ)(H˜n(y1, y2, y3) + h2E(zn[y3 − ul2 ]− wn)) + γH˜n(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2)
for retailer n and
H˜3(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2) + T1(y1, y2, y3) + T2(y1, y2, y3)
= γD(3)(y1, y2, y3) + H˜3(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2) + γD(3)(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2)
for the supplier. These costs are identical to those resulting from the coordination. The
optimal base stock levels are yn = Sn and y3 = S3 (see Theorem 6.2). Hence, the minimal
costs resulting from this coordination are
(1− γ)(H˜n(S1, S2, S3) + h2E(zn[S3 − ul2 ]− wn)) + γH˜n(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2)
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for retailer n and
γD(3)(S1, S2, S3) + H˜3(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2) + γD(3)(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2)
for the supplier. To summarize: coordination of installations in a distribution system can be
implemented in practice by considering actual costs and keeping track of demands in the past
l2 + l1 + 1 periods at both retailers.
7 Conclusions
In this paper coordination mechanisms for three-echelon serial and distribution systems under
decentralized control are studied. This decentralized control implies that the echelon base
stock levels set by the installations need not be optimal from the perspective of the supply
chain as a whole. The selfish installations act in their own self interest, which conflicts with
global interests. For serial and distribution systems, coordination mechanisms are presented
that work under very mild conditions. Both mechanisms are based upon the idea that in-
stallations should be fully compensated for cost increases due to larger base stock levels and
should also receive something extra that should persuade the installations to join the coop-
eration. The mechanisms alter the costs in such a way that the global optimum is the unique
Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. The practical implementation of these
mechanisms is discussed.
All the results in this paper can easily be extended to N -echelon serial and distribution
systems, where N > 3. Directions for future research include the extension of these results
to distribution systems with unequal lead time and holding costs for the retailers, as well as
asymmetric information availability in serial and distribution systems.
8 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1.
According to the definition of DN we derive subsequently
D1(y1) =
∫ ∞
0
L1(y1 − ul1)dFl1(ul1)
= h1(y1 − (l1 + 1)µ) + (p+ h1 + h2 + h3)
∫ ∞
y1
(ul1+1 − y1)dFl1+1(ul1+1)
for a one-echelon system,
D2(y1, y2) = D1(y1) +
∫ ∞
0
L2(y2 − ul2)dFl2(ul2)
+
∫ ∞
y2−y1
[D1(y2 − ul2)−D1(y1)]dFl2(ul2)
= D1(y1) + h2(y2 − (l2 + 1)µ) +
∫ ∞
y2−y1
[D1(y2 − ul2)−D1(y1)]dFl2(ul2)
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for a two-echelon serial system. Finally, notice that for j ≥ 2
Cj−1(y1, . . . , yj−2, yj − ulj )− Cj−1(y1, . . . , yj−2, yj−1)
= Dj−1(y1, . . . , yj−2, yj − ulj )−Dj−1(y1, . . . , yj−2, yj−1).
Using this identity, we obtain
D3(y1, y2, y3)
= D2(y1, y2) +
∫ ∞
0
L3(y3 − ul3)dFl3(ul3)
+
∫ ∞
y3−y2
[D2(y1, y3 − ul3)−D2(y1, y2)]dFl3(ul3)
= D2(y1, y2) + h3(y3 − (l3 + 1)µ) +
∫ ∞
y3−y2
[D2(y1, y3 − ul3)−D2(y1, y2)]dFl3(ul3)
for a three-echelon serial system. 
Proof of Lemma 3.1.
Start with D3(y1, y2, y3) as formulated in Lemma 2.1:
D3(y1, y2, y3)
= D2(y1, y2) + h3(y3 − (l3 + 1)µ) +
∫ ∞
y3−y2
[D2(y1, y3 − ul3)−D2(y1, y2)]dFl3(ul3)
= h3(y3 − (l3 + 1)µ) +
∫ y3−y2
0
D2(y1, y2)dFl3(ul3) +
∫ ∞
y3−y2
D2(y1, y3 − ul3)dFl3(ul3)
= h3(y3 − (l3 + 1)µ) +
∫ ∞
0
D2(y1,min(y3 − ul3 , y2))dFl3(ul3)
= h3(y3 − (l3 + 1)µ) + ED2(y1, w2).
Among similar lines we obtain
D2(y1, w2) = D1(y1) + h2(w2 − (l2 + 1)µ) +
∫ ∞
w2−y1
[D1(w2 − ul2)−D1(y1)]dFl2(ul2)
= h2(w2 − (l2 + 1)µ) + ED1(w1),
and D1(w1) follows directly from Lemma 2.1. 
Proof of Lemma 3.2.
The true cost for installation 1 is
H˜1(y1, y2, y3) = ED˜1(w1)
= E (D1(w1) + (h2 + h3)(w1 − (l1 + 1)µ))
= ED1(w1) + (h2 + h3)(wˆ1 − (l1 + 1)µ)
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where the second equality is due to (3.1) and wˆ1 = Ew1. The true expected cost for installation
2 is
H˜2(y1, y2, y3)
= (h2 + h3)l1µ+ (h2 + h3)E
∫ ∞
0
max(w2 − ul2 − y1, 0)dFl2(ul2)
= (h2 + h3)l1µ+ (h2 + h3)E
∫ ∞
0
(w2 − ul2 − y1 −min(w2 − ul2 − y1, 0))dFl2(ul2)
= (h2 + h3)l1µ+ (h2 + h3)E
(
w2 − l2µ− y1 −
∫ ∞
0
(w1 − y1)dFl2(ul2)
)
= (h2 + h3)l1µ+ (h2 + h3)(wˆ2 − l2µ− wˆ1),
where the third equality follows from min(w2 − ul2 − y1, 0) = w1 − y1. Similarly one obtains
H˜3(y1, y2, y3) = h3l2µ+ h3(y3 − l3µ− wˆ2), the true expected cost for installation 3. 
Proof of Lemma 3.3.
Adding H˜1 and H˜2 gives
(H˜1 + H˜2)(y1, y2, y3)
= ED1(w1) + (h2 + h3)(wˆ1 − (l1 + 1)µ) + (h2 + h3)l1µ+ (h2 + h3)(wˆ2 − l2µ− wˆ1)
= ED1(w1) + (h2 + h3)(wˆ2 − (l2 + 1)µ)
= ED2(y1, w2) + h3(wˆ2 − (l2 + 1)µ). (8.1)
The first equality is due to Lemma 3.2 and the last one follows from Lemma 3.1. Adding H˜3
results in
(H˜1 + H˜2 + H˜3)(y1, y2, y3)
= ED2(y1, w2) + h3(wˆ2 − (l2 + 1)µ) + h3l2µ+ h3(y3 − l3µ− wˆ2)
= ED2(y1, w2) + h3(y3 − (l3 + 1)µ)
= D3(y1, y2, y3)
Again, Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.1 are used. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
Under y3 = y2 the real order-up-to-level w2 for installation 2 becomes w′2 = min(y2−ul3 , y2) =
y2 − ul3 . This level has an expected value of wˆ′2 = y2 − l3µ. Substituting this in (8.1) results
in
(H˜1 + H˜2)(y1, y2, y2) = ED2(y1, y2 − ul3) + h3(y2 − (l3 + l2 + 1)µ)
= (h2 + h3)(y2 − (l3 + l2 + 1)µ) + ED1(w1)
where the second equality follows from Lemma 3.1. From the same Lemma, one can see that
this expression for (H˜1 + H˜2)(y1, y2, y2) is equal to the total cost D2(y1, y2) of a two-echelon
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serial system in case installation 2 has holding cost h2 + h3 and lead time l2 + l3 (instead of
h2 and l2 respectively). Therefore, by Lemma 2.2, the cost (H˜1+ H˜2)(y1, y2, y2) is minimized
in y1 = S1 and y2 = S˜2 > S2. The larger lead time leads to a higher base stock level for
installation 2. 
Proof of Theorem 4.2.
In the optimum (S1, S˜2, S˜2), surplus-1 is positive because
D3(S1, S˜2, S˜2) = min
y1,y2
D3(y1, y2, y2) < min
y1
D3(y1, y1, y1) = D3(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1).
Furthermore,
H ′1(S1, S˜2, S˜2)− H˜1(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)
= (1− α)D3(S1, S˜2, S˜2) + αD3(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)− h3l2µ− H˜2(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)− H˜1(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)
= (1− α)D3(S1, S˜2, S˜2) + αD3(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)− (H˜1 + H˜2 + H˜3)(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)
= (1− α)D3(S1, S˜2, S˜2)− (1− α)D3(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)
< 0
After compensating installation 2, installation 1 is better off than before the coordination
(due to the positive surplus). For installation 2 we derive
H ′2(S1, S˜2, S˜2)− H˜2(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1) = αD3(S1, S˜2, S˜2)− αD3(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1) < 0.
The compensation leads to lower costs for installation 2. We conclude that both installations
gain from the coordination. 
Proof of Theorem 4.3.
According to Lemma 2.2 D3(S1, y2, y3) is minimized in (S1, y2, y3) = (S1, S2, S3). In this
minimum, surplus-2 is equal toD3(S1, S˜2, S˜2)−D3(S1, S2, S3). This surplus is positive because
D3(S1, S2, S3) = min
y1,y2,y3
D3(y1, y2, y3) < min
y1,y2
D3(y1, y2, y2) = D3(S1, S˜2, S˜2)
where the first equality is due to Lemma 2.2. Using this we obtain
(H1 +H2)(S1, S2, S3)
= (1− β)D3(S1, S2, S3)− H˜3(S1, S˜2, S˜2) + βD3(S1, S˜2, S˜2)
= (1− β)D3(S1, S2, S3)− (1− β)D3(S1, S˜2, S˜2) +D3(S1, S˜2, S˜2)− H˜3(S1, S˜2, S˜2)
< D3(S1, S˜2, S˜2)− H˜3(S1, S˜2, S˜2)
= (H ′1 +H
′
2)(S1, S˜2, S˜2)
for the installations 1 and 2 and
H3(S1, S2, S3) = βD3(S1, S2, S3) + H˜3(S1, S˜2, S˜2)− βD3(S1, S˜2, S˜2)
< H˜3(S1, S˜2, S˜2)
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for installation 3. Both inequalities follow from surplus-2 being positive in the minimum
(S1, S2, S3). 
Proof of Lemma 4.4.
The cost distribution results in a cost saving for installation 1 because
H ′1(S1, S2, S3)
= (1− α)(D3 − H˜3)(S1, S2, S3) + α(D3 − H˜3)(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)− H˜2(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)
< (1− α)(D3 − H˜3)(S1, S˜2, S˜2) + α(D3 − H˜3)(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)− H˜2(S˜1, S˜1, S˜1)
= H ′1(S1, S˜2, S˜2),
where D3(S1, S2, S3) < D3(S1, S˜2, S˜2) and H˜3(S1, S2, S3) > H˜3(S1, S˜2, S˜2) are used. Installa-
tion 2 saves cost if
H ′2(S1, S2, S3) + compensation to 3 < H
′
2(S1, S˜2, S˜2),
or if the compensation to 3 is smaller than H ′2(S1, S˜2, S˜2) − H ′2(S1, S2, S3). Concentrate on
this latter difference:
H ′2(S1, S˜2, S˜2)−H ′2(S1, S2, S3)
= α(D3 − H˜3)(S1, S˜2, S˜2)− α(D3 − H˜3)(S1, S2, S3)
= α
(
(H ′1 +H
′
2)(S1, S˜2, S˜2)− (H ′1 +H ′2)(S1, S2, S3)
)
,
which is larger than the compensation paid to 3 if α > α. Equation (4.1) is used in the final
equality. 
Proof of Theorem 4.5.
The coordination mechanism leads to the unique choice (S1, S2, S3) of base stock levels. Fur-
thermore, in this optimum all players have lower cost than on their own and the players 1
and 2 also have lower cost compared to the first round of negotiation if α > α. We conclude
that (S1, S2, S3) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic game. 
Proof of Lemma 6.1.
Minimizing Hn(y1, y2, y3) with respect to yn is equivalent to minimizing
H˜n(y1, y2, y3) + h2E(zn[y3 − ul2 ]− wn)
because the other terms inHn(y1, y2, y3) are constants. If we recall the definition of H˜n(y1, y2, y3),
this expression can be rewritten to
ECn(wn) + h2E(zn[y3 − ul2 ]− u(n)l1+1).
The second term is independent of yn. Therefore minimizing Hn(y1, y2, y3) boils down to
minimizing ECn(wn) with respect to yn, where
ECn(wn) = Cn(yn)Fl2(y3 − (y1 + y2)) +
∫ ∞
y3−(y1+y2)
Cn(zn[y3 − ul2 ])dFl2(ul2).
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The first order condition for a minimum of ECn(wn) is
C ′n(yn)Fl2(y3 − (y1 + y2))− (Cn(yn)− Cn(zn[y1 + y2]))fl2(y3 − (y1 + y2)) = 0.
Due to zn[y1 + y2] = yn this first order condition reduces to
C ′n(yn)Fl2(y3 − (y1 + y2)) = 0.
This equality holds if yn = Sn because Sn minimizes Cn. The second order condition for a
minimum is also satisfied. 
Proof of Theorem 6.3.
First, consider the retailers. Denote wn by wn(y1, y2, y3) to explicitly show the dependence
on (y1, y2, y3). Due to Lemma 6.1
Hn(S1, S2, S3)
< Hn(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2)
= (1− γ)(H˜n(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2) + h2E(zn[S˜1 + S˜2 − ul2 ]− wn(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2)))
+ γH˜n(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2)
= H˜n(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2)
The last equality results from wn(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2) = zn[S˜1 + S˜2 − ul2 ].
Second, consider the supplier.
H3(S1, S2, S3) = γD(3)(S1, S2, S3) + H˜2(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2)− γD(3)(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2)
< H˜3(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2)
where the inequality follows from D(3)(S1, S2, S3) < D(3)(S˜1, S˜2, S˜1 + S˜2). 
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